Saturday, July 12, 2014

Chapter 6 - "The Setting of the Story"

[This is an ongoing project that is analyzing N.T. Wright’s 5 volume series, Christian Origins and the Question of God. This series is widely read and bridges the gap between the academic and devotional world. It is therefore worthy to be carefully analyzed so that all readers can understand his key points while at the same time gaining a critical eye to some of his rather bold claims. This series of posts are concerning volume 1 – The New Testament and the People of God.]


This chapter is the first of several wherein Wright will discuss the world in which Jesus and the nascent Jesus movement was born. His goal is laudable – in order to understand anything about Jesus in his own day, it is necessary to understand carefully his world in first-century Palestine. To accomplish this, Wright focuses upon Judaism in the first century as a unified worldview and uses that as a filter through which he discusses all other aspects of first century life (Hellenistic culture, Roman imperialism, political change and challenge). This becomes Wright’s most interesting element to his approach, but it also causes many of his biggest mistakes – both those of commission and omission.

Wright rightly argues that our understanding of Judaism in the first century has increased dramatically in the past 60 years. He points out that in the aftermath of World War II, there was an interest among scholars of religion to take Judaism more seriously as its own religion rather than a mere cipher for theological arguments in Christianity. Further, more recent archaeological finds have produced far more sources, making us aware of Judaism far more on its own terms rather than through later sources.

Wright, while valuing the work on Judaism in the past several decades, also is concerned that scholarship has gone too far. He argues that scholars are hypersensitive to the problem of caricaturizing Jews in the first century and are instead attempting to make an alternate argument. Wright makes a bold caricature of these scholars: 
The problem is all the more acute when Western Christian scholarship is in the middle of a long-drawn-out process of repentance for having cherished false views about Judaism. Scholars and preachers tumble over one another to say that they were misguided, that they misjudged the Pharisees, that Jesus and his followers had no quarrel with the Jews, that it was only later that the evangelists, under pressure, produced the caricatures of Jesus’ opponents that we find in the gospels. How long it will be before things settle down again is difficult to say.[1]
His tone is nearly sarcastic. He argues that scholars are allowing their modern sensibilities to get in the way of good historical argument. He says this quite directly calling upon scholars to move beyond their feelings of guilt over the horrors of the holocaust:
The historical task cannot be accomplished by the back-projection of modern guilt-feelings, any more than it was advanced by the back-projection of later theological controversy and prejudice.[2]
Here Wright calls out scholarship and arguing that it is time to do fair historical reconstruction rather than a theologically driven argument (as either apologists for Judaism or opponents of it).

The problem, of course, is that Wright has stacked the deck to make his argument. There certainly are some modern scholars of Christianity who do want to exonerate the collective guilt of Christianity for its treatment of Jews over the past two thousand years; however, this group is not the majority. Most scholars who have presented a new understanding of Judaism are not doing this out of genocidal guilt, they are doing it out of good observation of new pieces of data that are available now that simply were not in previous generations. In short, they are trying to be good historians. The fact that much of the research presents a Judaism that is far more sympathetic with Jesus is not because modern scholars have “softened” the data – it is because many scholars think Judaism frankly was more sympathetic with Jesus than later Christianity was (quite frankly it would be difficult for Jesus to be less sympathetic with Jews than later Christianity was).

With this as his sensibility and major argument, Wright moves forward to his goal of providing the context for Jesus by discussing Judaism at this time period. Wright rightly considers “Judaism” as not limited to particular actions but instead is a true “worldview” in the modern sense:
The main feature of first-century Judaism, within Palestine at least, was neither a static sense of a religion to which one adhered, nor a private sphere of religion into which one escaped, but a total worldview, embracing all aspects of reality, and coming to sharp focus in a sense of longing and expectation, of recognition that the present state of affairs had not yet (to put it mildly) seen the full realization of the purposes of the covenant god for his people.[3]
Here Wright develops a concept of a “worldview” – that he has discussed in earlier chapters and argues that such a worldview was based upon the relationship between the people and their covenant God. Here, Wright does a good job showing some of the basic ideas of Judaism at the time of Jesus.

The concept of “Judaism” as a worldview is Wright’s strength. This idea is one that tries to take seriously the issue of the diversity of differing opinions among Jews while at the same time recognizing some kind of commonality – it seemed that most Jews did not think that the sectarian differences that divided them actually divided them so much that they would not call each other “Jews” any longer (with perhaps a few exceptions). Rather than using anachronistic terms like “religion” or “race,” Wright uses the concept of a worldview to express this idea.

The weakness of this “worldview” approach is that it too is an anachronism – though it should be noted that just because something is new does not necessarily make it wrong. The problem with the “worldview” is that it locks Wright into a few ideas that are less defensible. Most importantly, a worldview is unified. Wright argues that Judaism was a single thing at the time of Jesus:
I shall argue later that Christianity’s link with Judaism is not with one particular sub-group and set of literary remains, but with Judaism as a whole, whether in reaffirmation, confrontation or redefinition. And Judaism as a whole is seen as much if not more in its symbolic world and political movements as in its (possibly idiosyncratic) literary remains.[4] 
Here Wright expresses his clear opinion – Judaism was an essential thing as a whole at the time of Jesus (probably in the way that he considers modern Christianity a single thing despite denominational differences). Here is where Wright makes his largest mistake. I completely agree that a Pharisee did not probably see a Sadducee as someone who was no longer a Jew, but that did not mean they had the same worldview. There certainly were major differences of opinion among them and it is difficult to argue that they even held the same symbolic world.

Wright’s emphasis on “story” seems to be why he feels it is acceptable to consider a single worldview for all of the different Jews at the time of Jesus. Wright’s implicit argument (though he leaves it to the reader to infer) is that because all Jewish groups shared a common history as expressed in the Hebrew Bible, then it is logical that they ought to have the same worldview. He shows that he holds this view by arguing that even the Jesus movement has the same worldview because, after all, it claims the story as well:
In fact (this is the fourth point), first-century Judaism and Christianity have a central worldview-feature in common: the sense of a story now reaching its climax. And, most importantly, it is the same story.[5]
Wright has now gone too far – he has suggested monolithically, that if one shares a common mythos, then one shares the same worldview. In the early to mid (and maybe even late) first century, there is some argument that Jewish Christianity shared a worldview with different Jewish groups. However, in the second century – when Christians continued to share the same “story” and thus should share the same “worldview,” the differences between Jews and Christians were astounding. The idea that these two religions (and by that time they were clearly two different religions) held the same worldview either is laughable or it dilutes the concept of a worldview to a point that there is little reason in using the term.

After presenting this idea of worldview, then he continues into the Roman society of Jews in the first century. Wright does point out many key points that were challenges for Jews in Palestine. He rightly discusses the challenge of the monotheism of the Jews and its struggle to fit in with a polytheistic culture.[6] He further argues that for Jews the challenge was one of self-identity – how is it that Jews would adapt to this changing world around them. Wright presents the point well:
The self-understanding of Jews at this time was determined by the pressing question as to whether they should attempt to be distinct from this alien culture, and if so how. Pressure to assimilate was strong in many quarters, as is suggested by the evidence for Jews attempting to remove the marks of circumcision.[7]
Here, I completely agree with Wright that the challenge for most Jews was the measured response to this culture that was thrust upon them. Some embraced Hellenistic culture, others avoided it, and others found a place in between. Here Wright is correct.

What Wright does not do is explain the main cause of some Jews Hellenizing – the Babylonian Exile. In 586 B.C.E. the vast majority of the citizenry of the country Israel were taken from the land into exile having been conquered by the Babylonian empire. In 539 B.C.E., Cyrus the Great of Persia – for reasons completely separate from anything dealing with Israel – conquered the Babylonians and issued the Edict of Cyrus allowing all conquered people to go back home. Where this becomes difficult for Jews in antiquity is that many Jews did not go home – they continued living in diaspora – away from the land of Israel. These Jews (and it is at this time of 539 that it is appropriate to call them “Jews”), the ones living throughout the empire, still considered themselves fully Jewish and continued practicing standard Torah procedures. However, they also very often accommodated to culture around them – at least to some extent.

Wright is formally only interested in Judaism in Palestine in the first century. However, to consider Jews in Palestine without considering Jews in diaspora is a modern rather than ancient dichotomy. The reason that the management of how much they should accommodate to culture around them was so difficult is that many Jews – still remaining Jews – living throughout the world had accommodated quite a lot and were very frequently prospering. Jews in Palestine were aware of this situation and it caused a variety of different ideas – hardly “one worldview.”

On the whole, Wright’s analysis is an example of many depictions of Judaism in the first century that have been presented in the past 30 years by Christian authors. It attempts to manage the data about Judaism and then simplify it to a key point about what “the Jews” believed. In point of fact, Jews had a widely varied religion in the first century. There certainly were some points of continuity between them, but it is more important to see their differences than their similarities in some ways. It seems that Wright has done this for one particular reason – it is easier to understand Christianity if it is paired with a clear “Judaism” that is one thing for an easy counterpoint. In the coming chapters, Wright will discuss Judaism’s complexities more carefully, but throughout the discussion, it will be constrained by this idea of “worldview.”



[1] NTPG, 148.
[2] Ibid., 148.
[3] Ibid., 148-149.
[4] Ibid., 150.
[5] Ibid., 150.
[6] Ibid., 155.
[7] Ibid., 158.

Friday, July 4, 2014

Chapter 5 – “Theology, Authority and the New Testament”


[This is an ongoing project that is analyzing N.T. Wright’s 5 volume series, Christian Origins and the Question of God. This series is widely read and bridges the gap between the academic and devotional world. It is therefore worthy to be carefully analyzed so that all readers can understand his key points while at the same time gaining a critical eye to some of his rather bold claims. This series of posts are concerning volume 1 – The New Testament and the People of God.]

N.T. Wright’s final “theoretical” chapter in his series on Christian Origins is one considering New Testament theology. Unlike his previous chapters on the theory, I have far fewer challenges to his theory of what theology is or how it applies to the New Testament. While I certainly have frustrations with Wright on a variety of levels, here he is internally consistent and I will not be attempting to show that he is presenting something insufficient as theory. This is a vast improvement over his first four chapters of his book. That being said, this chapter has a major problem in how he tries to apply that theory of theology to modern readers. His argument for the authority of the text as more universal than a basic matter of faith is important because it provides a case study from common tropes in the study of the New Testament.

As a historian of early Christianity teaching at a Christian college, students are often shocked when I take a historical/sociological approach to the study of the Christianity. Students (and some colleagues) are shocked that I am not taking a “theological” approach to the subject. When pressed for what a “theological approach” means and why that is so different from the historical/sociological, the student has trouble saying anything beyond a vague discussion of “truth.” N.T. Wright’s chapter provides an excellent case study in what people often mean when they discuss a “theological” approach and what it is they are hoping to see in that approach that is different from the historical. This analysis will show the strengths and weaknesses of that approach.

First, the idea that a historical/sociological approach to Christianity will not include theology is ridiculous. Theology is the study of how humans interact with God. As such, any discussion about a religion is a discussion about theology. Wright defines theology in a way that is relatively standard and helpful:
It is possible to suggest a sharply focused definition of theology: theology is the study of gods, or a god. It is also possible, and today quite common, to work with a more wide-ranging definition, interacting with elements of the worldview pattern: theology suggests certain ways of telling the story, explores certain ways of answering the questions, offers particular interpretations of the symbols, and suggests and critiques certain forms of praxis.[1]
Wright’s definition is helpful here – he folds theology within the pattern of worldview. He suggests that theology is a way of understanding and providing ethical norms for how one lives one’s life.

It should be noted that Wright’s initial phrase that theology is the “study of gods” is simply inaccurate. Gods, being defined as “other,” does not allow for simple discussion of who they are on their own. That practice is mere speculation. Instead, theology is how the gods interact with humans. Wright later clarifies this point making this very claim:  
Theology thus tells stories about human beings and the world, stories which involve either a being not reducible to materialist analysis or at least a provocative space within the story-line where such a being might, by implication, be located. In the light of this story-telling activity, theology asks questions, as to whether there is a god, what relation this god has to the world in which we live, and what if anything this god is doing, or will do, about putting it to rights.[2]
Theology (or at least Christian theology) has no interest in discussing aspects about God that is unrelated to humans. Theology is instead a study of interaction between God and humans – both directly and indirectly. Here, Wright and I have no major disagreement except perhaps aesthetically in an argument.

Further, Wright and I agree that one of the most important aspects to understanding theology is not only what are the stated beliefs and interactions with God, but also the consequent beliefs that are usually unintentional. Wright presents this in the following way:
These basic beliefs and aims, which serve to express and perhaps safeguard the worldview, give rise in turn to consequent beliefs and intentions, about the world, oneself, one’s society, one’s god.[3]
The study of theology is important in understanding which beliefs were primary and which secondary – namely which were placed for the intended meaning and which were elements with unintended consequences. For example, no religion wants fewer people to be members of it. However, nearly every religion (at least nearly every branch of Christianity) is exclusive. Religions are exclusive as a consequence – the intended purpose was to establish identity of “who we are.” If we want that identity to mean anything, then boundaries have to be established to make clear who we are not – thereby necessitating exclusivity.

The problem with Wright’s analysis is when he tries to do more than describe the theology of the first century and instead begins to suggest that we should be able to know more about theology now than simply “this is what people held.” He chastises what he sees as the academic majority for not taking theology seriously. Wright pedantically suggests as such:
Many thinkers, politicians and even biblical scholars dismiss ‘theology’ as if it were simply a set of answers that might be given to a pre-packaged set of abstract dogmatic questions, but it cannot possibly be reduced to that level.[4]
He seems to have shifted foci. If he was discussing theology as the things that the writers of the New Testament were thinking of, I do not know of a single Biblical historian who would not consider it seriously and his statement would be nonsense.

Wright has pulled a classic bait and switch – he got everyone agreeing with him on the importance of considering the theological elements of the New Testament to then shift the conversation to a current state that we, the modern readers, need to adopt in order to read the arguments carefully. Wright rightly points out that theology is a normative discourse:
The whole includes a necessarily normative element. It will attempt not just to describe but to commend a way of looking at, speaking about, and engaging with the god in whom Christians believe, and with the world that this god has created. It will carry the implication this is not only what is believed but what ought to be believed.[5]
Again, this is completely accurate for the discussion of the first century – the New Testament was not written by people who were not thinking normatively – of course they were. The problem is that Wright now wants modern readers to adopt this very same approach.

Wright is offended by the idea that scholars avoid such normative discussion and that it is relegated to the matter of opinion:
[The academic study of Christianity] has been helped by the impression which is given, precisely within the post-Enlightenment worldview itself, that matters of religious opinion are simply private options which do not engage with the public world.[6]
Wright sets up a discourse wherein he accuses the academy (if indeed it rightly is one thing) of adopting a post-enlightenment view that considers religion as “private options.”

Quite frankly, Wright is correct that the academy views religion as something very personal. He seems to suggest that this is a new development and that it shows the failure of the academy. It is certainly the case that there were times in the history of Christianity wherein religion was not nearly as individual (meaning that people were far less creative in how they constructed their religious belief), but not really a time when religion was less personal in Christianity. That something is personal is simply to suggest that one has adopted it as a major component of one’s own worldview. The source and content of that (whether one thinks it was revealed by God directly, provided by the community, chosen by the individual) does not change the fact that it is personally held. What Wright seems to want to do is to chastise the academy for recognizing that some things are “matters of faith.”

Wright, of course, would never admit this – he would always suggest that some things are matters of faith – he simply struggles to discuss what makes this approach so different. This brings us back to the common trope that one should consider the text more “theologically.” This seems to mean that the teacher should assume everyone holds the same views as he or she does and then tell everyone what is normative about it. The reason this is so frustrating for a teacher is that the actual content is not tremendously different. If I teach a class telling the students “The Gospel of Mark considers x normative” is that really different in content than saying, “X is normative as expressed by the Gospel of Mark?”

Wright admits that the content is not primarily of major difference and instead it is simply a matter of authority. Wright argues that a major component of the “theological” is that of authority:
Since (a) stories are a key worldview indicator in any case, and (b) a good part of the New Testament consists of stories, of narratives, it might be a good idea to consider how stories might carry, or be vehicles for, authority.[7]
This seems to be Wright’s main purpose in discussing the “theological” approach – he wants to find a way that the text can be seen as authoritative for his readers. He suggests that this is like unto a 5 part play wherein we only have the first four parts and we are set to create the fifth. He argues that in such a system, there can be authority still present even though it is a human development by us (rather than the original play):
Nevertheless, there will be a rightness, a fittingness, about certain actions and speeches, about certain final moves in the drama, which will in one sense be self-authenticating, and in another gain authentication form their coherence with, their makings sense of, the ‘authoritative’ previous text.[8]
Here, Wright’s goals are made clear. If we follow his logic, the original 4 parts of the play are the “known authority” – namely the story of the Biblical text. The thing he wants “authority” over is the fifth part – how we are living our lives right now. When Wright discusses authority concerning theology of the Biblical texts, he doesn’t want to discuss the authority of the texts, he wants to discuss the authority of how we are living right now.

This chapter of Wright’s book is very helpful because this seems to be precisely what is challenged to me regularly when discussing the New Testament. The earlier rhetorical divide between “The Gospel of Mark considers x normative” and “X is normative as expressed in the Gospel of Mark” is not what people mean when they request the “theological” approach. They seem to want to know less about if the texts are authoritative – they want to know what is authoritative for their life right now. Rather than the two comments about the Gospel of Mark, they want a statement more like, “You should follow x and y” with a sidebar that reads “which by the way, happens to be built upon an idea found in the Gospel of Mark.” The discussion is not a discussion of the content of the text, nor even its nature (as inspired or not), but rather, a discussion of how one currently ought to live one’s life.



[1] NTPG, 126.
[2] Ibid., 127.
[3] Ibid., 126.
[4] Ibid., 130.
[5] Ibid., 131.
[6] Ibid., 137.
[7] Ibid., 140.
[8] Ibid., 141.