Critical responses to David Kinnaman and David Lyons, unchristian: What A New Generation Thinks About Christianity…and Why It Matters. (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2007).

The following is a little different than my usual discussion. A friend asked me to review a book for him several months ago about modern Christianity. I reviewed the book purely in terms of sociological methodology. I am no sociologist, but I felt that some comments needed to be made about the use of data in this text. I provide my comments below.

Critical responses to David Kinnaman and David Lyons, unchristian: What A New Generation Thinks About Christianity…and Why It Matters. (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2007).

The text has an admirable stated goal – to see how Christianity is viewed by outsiders from the ages of 16-29 (what the book calls the generation of “mosaics” and “busters”). This view might be helpful for those interested in understanding these generational gap, how religion is perceived in the world, or for churches attempting to understand their role and image in society (15). This view is admirable and much of the research done by this Barna group might well represent the views of 16-29 year olds generally. The book, however, fails on two fronts.

The books posits that outsiders, age 16-29 view Christianity (in descending order of consensus) with the following negative attributes: anti-homosexual, judgmental, hypocritical, old-fashioned, too involved in politics, out of touch with reality, insensitive to others, boring, not accepting of other religions, and confusing.  The same group felt that the following positive characteristics could be found (though it should be noted, the numbers often are lower than the negative characteristics): teaches same basic idea with other religions, has good values and principles, friendly, a faith you can respect, consistently shows love for other people, offers hope for the future, people you trust, seems genuine and real, something that makes sense, and relevant to your life (28).

First, it fails to present the actual research data that a sociologically sound document would require to be understood and analyzed by a reader. The readers are left to take it as an article of faith that the Barna group has accurately and precisely described their research. Giving the Barna group as much credit as possible, this short essay will assume that the Barna group is generally trustworthy and that their statistics are sound.

Secondly, and more troubling than the lack of statistics are the conclusions the authors draw from this data sample. A good sociological theory is a theory that predicts how people will act in a given circumstance. Therefore, if the goal of the book is to understand how Christianity is viewed by outsiders of ages 16-29, the conclusions should be asking why and in what circumstances such people hold these views. This would provide the reader with ample discussion of differences in values that might show the bias of an individual thereby making spurious relationships no longer present (e.g. are these views specific of Christianity or merely the generation preceding them at large and Christianity is merely seen as a category of that older generation).

More significant, however, than their lack of useful conclusions that would explain the data is the authors’ rampant conclusions about how to “fix this problem.” These views are mere opinions of the authors as their research was not directed toward this view whatsoever. They seem to have decent research that outsiders have a particular problem with Christianity – for instance, that 91% of outsiders think Christianity is “anti-homosexual” (93). Further, they have follow up thoughts that most outsiders think that Christians believe that 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina are God’s judgments on homosexuals. They think that pastors and other Christian leaders are attacking gays, Christians use course jokes and prejudical slurs, and that aggressive anti-homosexual websites are the general views of most Christians. (93-94). The study then goes into an interesting comparison that such views are generally held by a majority of what the study calls “born again Christians” (94-95). This data is striking and ought to be considered in depth to lead to an interesting conclusion; the authors’ response to this, however, is not trying to understand carefully why this is true. Rather, they go into a discussion that Christians must respect other people more than they do, and that they need to offer forgiveness for these sins. (95-109) The data for this is completely anecdotal. There is no seeming consensus of data that they present at all. It even seems that their study did not even ask these questions. Had they done a study of people who were openly gay and had them describe the positive/negative relationships they had with Christians and how they have been reached/turned off from Christianity, such a discussion would be possible. However, as it is currently stated, there is no reason to accept the generally “evangelical” doctrines of these figures.

While some may argue that such sociologically predictive theory is simply not possible, the work of sociologists of religion such as Rodney Stark, William Baimbridge, James Wellman, and Russel McCutcheon show that such predictive theories are not only possible but quite helpful. Rodney Stark has shown decisively how likely someone will be to join an emerging religious movement. He has been able to, given specific enough parameters, to generally predict what values will be most attractive to which people. This Barna study does not provide that type of analysis. While the general audience might be willing to accept their research data without proof and careful analysis as an article of faith, the general audience must not accept as equally the authors’ opinions bout how this can be changed when it is not based upon any data whatsoever.

Beyond the methodological nightmare that this book presented, the biases of the authors have completely voided the conclusions found. Even if the conclusions of the authors could be supported by some type of data, the analysis of that data would be aggressively skewed. For instance (using the anti-homosexual viewpoint because it was the most striking data that outsiders viewed), there is no discussion that there is a debate within Christianity on this topic. It is taken as a matter of fact that Christianity is opposed to the gay lifestyle. For instance, right after showing the striking evidence of both outsiders and insiders views of what Christians think about homosexuality, there is no discussion as to whether it should be seen as a sin. Instead, the discussion develops directly into the concept of forgiveness for sin (95-97). While this is certainly the view of the evangelical movement in America, nowhere in the book do the authors make clear this is the target audience and the foil from which all Christianity is drawn. Without this discussion, it is clear that the authors aren’t willing to entertain other ideas. This leads this reviewer to wonder if this might have been the cause of their lack of doing careful sociologically predictive theories about responses to these questions – perhaps the authors did not want conclusions that would not fit within their rather strict parameters.

In conclusion, the twenty aspects of how outsiders from the age of 16-29 view Christianity is quite useful. It is generally helpful to recognize the attributes, both positive and negative, of how Christianity is perceived. The study also shows very interesting comparisons with those inside the movement and those outside it view Christianity (summarized nicely in a chart on page 28). However, the conclusions drawn from these aspects are wildly conjectural, methodologically flawed, and unsupported by any type of data.   

 

“Holding all things in common” – the curious problem of Ananias and Sapphira

In the Book of Acts, the early Jesus movement community in Jerusalem is described as “holding all things in common.” Some social progressives have used the example of this community as an archetype of how one could live in a socialized community.  This interpretation would be bolstered by discussions such as that of Barnabas in Acts 4:32-37 who contributes all of his possessions and places it at the apostles feet to the effect that “there was not a needy person among them, for as many owned lands or houses sold them and brought the proceeds of what was sold. They laid it at the apostles’ feet, and it was distributed to each as any had need.”[1] This seeming command to hold things in community is at tension with the case of Ananias and Sapphira who sell land and hold a portion back for themselves. They are charged of lying to the community for holding some money back, not for holding the money back at all. Further, in Acts 12:12, Peter goes to the house of Mary who seems to be a member of the Jesus movement – how does she have a house if all houses were sold and the proceeds held in common?

Some scholars have questioned whether Acts portrays a historical situation at all, or if the discussion of holding things in common is only a literary ideal that never existed. Others suggest that the text never really requires the relinquishing of property and as such, it was entirely voluntary. This discussion is usually based upon the idea that such a radical renunciation would not fit with the general picture of the apparent quick conversions in Acts. At times, the argument even degenerates into the discussion of that such kind of renunciation would be too hard for potential converts and the community could not have grown. This short argument will address these objections and argue for a mitigating position that would allow for complete renunciation to be part of the group, but also allowing for less serious devotees to have attendance by means of a type of formal membership ritual which did require complete renunciation.

First, the laying of goods at the apostles’ feet seems to be a ritual. The first notation of the ritual in chapter two pairs the laying of money at the apostles’ feet with other standard ritual acts: “All who believed were together and had all things in common. They would sell their possessions and goods and distribute the proceeds to all, as any had need. Day by day, as they spent much time together in the temple, they broke bread at home and ate their food with glad and generous hearts, praising God and having the goodwill of all the people.”[2] Two elements are noted – first is the pairing of breaking bread and laying out possessions. Second is that this activity is done in the temple – a geographic location where their activity is centered around preaching, prayer, and breaking of bread – all ritual practice.

Another aspect of the ritual seems to be the giving of all of one’s possessions and laying them at the apostles’ feet. The critique of Ananias and Sapphira when they withhold a portion of the offering is that they could have done whatever they wanted with the money, but they offered it at the apostles’ feet. If they are going to do this, then it needs to be completely offered not partially. The figure of Barnabas is at least depicted as giving all of the money he obtained from the selling of his field at the apostles’ feet. Further, it is narrated that “no one claimed private ownership of any possessions, but everything they owned was held in common.”[3] Such clearly indicates that to go through the ritual of placing the money at the feet of the apostles implied that it was the entirety of the money of the individual.

If this act is seen as a ritual, it puts the case of Ananias and Sapphira in context. When they improperly offer a portion of their land and place it at the feet of the apostles, they are not only deceiving the apostles, but they are now improperly acting in a ritual act – one of the ways that they worship their God. This would make more sense as to how Peter argues that they are not deceiving the community but they are deceiving God. This ritual act is between the giver and God, not between the giver and the community.

If this is a ritual that is common to the group, then why the curious response of Peter when Ananias is discovered to have withheld a portion: “While it remained unsold, did it not remain your own? And after it was sold, were not the proceeds at your disposal? How is it that you have contrived this deed in your heart? You did not lie to us but to God!”[4] If it was expected that all members held all things in common, how was it that it was apparently acceptable for Ananias to have this piece of property or the money for himself? The problem is not that he withheld the money, but that he lied about giving over a portion. The text then suggests that there is a way that one can be in communion with the group but not hold everything in common (if they would have been allowed to keep the land had they chosen to do so).

Different scholars present different solutions to this problem. Some argue that the community never really held all things in common as a requirement for joining the group and as such, the offering would be voluntary. Others argue that no one really held all things in common but that this was a literary type that was created by the author to depict an “ideal church” for later readers. The problem with both of these theories is that they aren’t supported by the text. The text does seem to argue for one’s joining of the group contingent upon offering all one owns at the feet of the apostles. Further, to question the historical veracity of the practice is to miss the point. Whether the author is describing a historical community or an ideal literary community, the picture painted in the book ought be consistent with itself.

Brian Capper has proposed a solution that makes as much sense as any for the situation. Given that the laying of the money at the feet of the apostles is a ritual, it well could be a type of entrance ritual into the community proper. Capper argues that similar practices were instituted at Qumran (which they were) and that one would present all of one’s property while entering into the community provisionally before one became a full member.[5] This argument is quite attractive; however, it is unnecessary to suggest that the Jerusalem community need be like the Qumran without any evidence that the two know of one another.

The argument that this ritual is necessary for full membership in the community is helpful to explain how this seeming contradiction can be rectified. If this ritual is an entrance ritual into the community proper, then this is what Ananias and Sapphira fail to do. They could have merely attended the group without being members (probably not participating in the Eucharist and not being baptized, but listening to the sermons and prayers in the temple) and kept possession of their land; however, they attempted to join the group without giving up everything and thereby lying to God.  They are saying that they want to be in full communion with God and fully devoted, but then they are denying that very statement by means of their actions. Had they not made this commitment, then such a position would have been completely acceptable, it was the bringing of the two together that caused the problem.

The concept that there could be followers who were not members of the community would begin to make sense of some of the wildly large numbers in the book of Acts. How is it in the book that it suggests thousands join the group regularly – “So those who welcomed his message were baptized, and that day about three thousand persons were added.”[6] – while at the same time seeming to continue to be a small group that continues to meet in the outer court of the temple? The possibility could be posited that not all of those figures would have been fully entered into the group, they would have merely been attending the public events and as such the “core group” would not be the cast of thousands presented. This is not a necessary conclusion, but it might help make sense of a secondary issue.

The apparent contradiction in the structure of the Jerusalem community cannot be easily solved. The solution posited here does do a decent job relieving the tension. However, the author is well aware that the suggestion that this is an entrance ritual is not necessarily supported by all of the evidence of the text. However, at this point, it seems the best way to solve the issue without simply dismissing the evidence as literary construction which, for some reason, contradicts itself.    

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[1] Acts 4:34-35, NRSV.

[2] Acts 2:44-46

[3] Acts 4:32b

[4] Acts 5:4

[5] Brian Capper, “Interpretation of Acts 5.4” JSNT 19 (1983) 117-131.

[6] Acts 2:41

What Is Religion and Why Does Such Erudition Matter?

The field of religion is plagued by the enduring question of the definition of the its topic. What kind of definition of religion can competently include a monotheistic faith such as Judaism or Christianity while at the same time including an “atheistic” (in the sense of having no “gods”) such as some forms of modern Buddhism or Taoism? The attempts usually made either become so narrow that some things usually included as “religion” is excluded, or so wide that things that are nearly never considered religion would be included – for instance some definitions of religions would also perfectly describe political movements or even sporting events. However, the simple “let it be undefined because we all know what is being discussed” is at best scholarly abhorrent and at worst obfuscates the topic enough that any type of discussion is possible. Through a rethinking of the composition of a definition as such, religion can be classified in a way that might not be completely satisfactory for all of society, but will be helpful in understanding the general term called “religion.”

The first major challenge in defining religion is the essentialist thinking of most in Western society. Everyone wants to know what religion “is.” The problem with this approach is that no two people would have the same view. A devout Christian might say that religion is the proper expression of God’s love toward humans; whereas a skeptical atheist might suggest that religion is a human institution that deludes the rational component of humans. Neither of these statements can be proved wrong; similarly neither is proved correct. This kind of “essential” definition is not only impossible to verify, it is unhelpful beyond the insular confines of one’s own group. Often, these types of definitions of religion are not, in actuality, used for self-definition; rather, they are constructs used to attack those who disagree. This type of adversarial attitude is dismissive and as such has no place in scholarship.

Rather than focusing on what religions “are,” it is much better to describe how a religion functions. While the “truth” of a religion is an unverifiable dictum, how religions function for humans is something that can be helpfully analyzed. While the reality of the monotheistic Christian god can be disputed, that Christians find meaning from their constructed relationship with that god (whether he is real or not) is indisputable. This allows for a discussion that is both possible and helpful for a study that grows beyond the realm of a single tradition. From this point, then generalization and helpful comparison is possible.[1]

If it is possible to make some generalization about how religion usually functions for humans, when religions do not meet some of those expectations, then it causes a scholar to ask helpful questions. Further, if the function of religion can be predicted, then human behavior in relation to religion can be finally understood. In addition, the once undefinable, impossible, completely biased topic of discussion now becomes a reasonable subject of discourse.

The main objection to such a definition of religion is that it expects humans to act consistently. If humans are generally consistent, then religions can be expected to generally respond to needs for people consistently. This view is unprovable, but tenable. Due to the limits of measurable inquiry, there is no way to prove that humans will always act the same way (the fact that humans generally have acted consistently in the past is not sufficient proof for the future, as futures are by definition untestable); however, if the assumption that humans generally are consistent is a given, nearly the entirety of the known data (that which has occurred in the past and is occurring in the present) makes sense. To use an illustration, the argument for consistency of behavior of humans is likened unto an argument to interpret the meaning of a painting. There is no way to prove measurably an argument, it is possible to establish a rubric, that if accepted makes the whole of the painting make sense. A similar view can be taken toward the study of religion.

This argument uses James Wellman and Kyoko Tokuno’s description of religion as a helpful discussion of how religion can function. It is broad enough to address many of the key issues involved and a very good starting point from which further discussion can be directed. The description is presented, “The symbolic and social boundaries of religion (no matter how fluid or porous) mobilize individual and group identity in conflict, and sometimes violence, within and between groups.”[2] This is not a full definition of religion, but it provides helpful clues of how religions can function in everyday life. The first element is that religion mobilizes identity. This is the primary function of religion for people. Peter Berger argues that groups create “religious worlds” in order to find meaning and place in a constructed society.[3] This discussion of meaning and place in society is, for our purposes, a reasonable definition of “identity” as a descriptor of religion.

As one develops identity through an imagined creation of the social world around them through the vehicle called religion, it becomes necessary to build boundaries. It is impossible to know who one is without also knowing who one is not. This applies to an individual person believing in God (such as might be held by Schleiermacher), or by a group (such as the Roman Catholic church in the 19^th century). The spread of “heresy” in fact, is merely an insider who does not fit within the boundaries that a religion holds and must be driven out in order to sustain the integrity of the identity of a group.

The function of identity formation is done often by means of “truth-claims.” The easiest way for religions to define who they are is by describing the vacuous concept of “truth.” The philosophical concept of “truth” will not be addressed here, for our purposes, truth is described as the imagined fundamental elements that make one’s constructed “world” function. Without these elements, the constructed world no longer exists. For a fundamentalist Christian, that Jesus died to save the souls of humans who are inherently sinful is a truth – without this, their socially constructed identity no longer functions. Such a person might also hold that a combustible engine needs gasoline to function;  however, such a view is not necessary for their constructed world, and therefore this view would not be considered a truth. The second part of the view of “truth” is that fundamental elements (truth) are seen as universal. It is not only in their constructed world that these truths are held, but these truths apply to every aspect of the world and it is only they who have identified and used them in the most helpful paradigm (their constructed “world”).

The boundary creating aspect of religion is so strong that it is not an overstatement to think of religion in the same manner as one thinks of ethnicity. Ethnicities (in contrast to kinship) are not merely genealogical relations, they are “cultural” choices. One can self identify as “German” when in fact they live in America, have only one out of four grandparents that are of German descent, and have never spoken a word of German in their life. The individual, for whatever reason, has chosen to identify as German and has assumed some of the culture of that value and identified it as one’s own.[4] However, there are certain boundaries to ethnicity – one must participate in a bare minimum of cultural “knowns” or they are not really of that ethnicity. A similar view can be expressed toward religion. There are general boundaries that are rather rigid that must be at least generally followed or one cannot claim to really be part of that religious group. This then solves the awkward discussion of something like Judaism answering whether they are a religion or an ethnicity.  The answer is that not only is Judaism both, in fact all of religions are both – Judaism is only distinct in that it is less easy to join the group if you are not born into it than some other religions such as Christianity, for instance.[5]

Recognizing that religions function primarily for the purpose of identity creation and in the process establish boundaries, makes it possible to discuss how religions can compete and clash with one another and with larger culture. When firm boundaries are established, one expects challenges to those boundaries (both from within and without) to continually arise. This can help understand what is happening and why in a particular situation.

Whether one holds to the fundamental assumptions about religion or not, the way religions function is a necessary piece of education one must understand in order to mitigate the challenges of the world.             

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[1] These characteristics are drawn from Jonathan Z. Smith, Imagining Religion: From Zion to Jonestown, introduction.

[2] James Wellman Jr. and Kyoko Tokuno, “Is Religious Violence Inevitable?” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion.

[3] Peter Berger, Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion

[4] This view is necessarily overstated. No person describes oneself monolithically. One is not only German – one can identify as German, American, Male, Washingtonian, Democrat, and Christian with no apparent difficulty (for further on this issue see Amartya Sen – Identity in Violence).

[5] The concept of religion as ethnicity can be found in a number of works. A few noted authors are Craig Prentiss, Jonathan Hall, Denise Buell, and Catherine Hodge. 

Introduction

This blog is dedicated to the study of religion, culture, and thought of Early Christianity and Judaism as it can be understood in today's world. One of the striking elements of society is the complete lack of knowledge,  from both Christians and non Christians, of the New Testament and the development of the nascent Jesus movement into an eventual world religion called "Christianity." It has never ceased to amaze me how many people feel they have the "inspired word of God" in front of them and do not read it. This apathy and ignorance not only is unhelpful to devotees of the Christian faith, it keeps "Western Society" (if such a term is helpful) from understanding many of its roots and current biases (both good and bad).

Further, when people do look at things like the New Testament and Hellenistic religions, they often are unable to converse in common parlance about key questions such as "What is religion? What is faith? What is "the world" that is often contrasted with religion? Why is one thing a "world religion" whereas another is not? What is 'Orthodoxy?' What does it mean to live in a religious community?" The inability to discuss these types of questions makes discussion about the topic largely inclusive. Not only does this type of ambiguity not allow the conversation to get beyond the insular borders of those who are used to the assumptions that are being made; it also prevents precise discussion from happening altogether. When a person is not convinced whether religion is mostly a set of personal beliefs or a communal experience about the constitution of a group, any discussion of "how this relates to one's life" is simply impossible. When the aims of a discussion are not understood, how can the details of its theology be attempted? Too often the result of this type of vague discussion is only to demonize and dismiss those who do not share one's viewpoint. As long as the terms are vague, then it is quite easy to suggest that someone else is using them incorrectly. Usually the harder discussion of how it should be viewed correctly is not done as it is a type of "given" and allows people to snipe another's viewpoint in different forms while not being open to self critique.

Some might say that for a modern study of the sociology of religion this type of approach is absolutely necessary. For someone to understand the rise of Scientology in America, for instance, it would be necessary to describe exactly what is meant by "Scientology" - the theory of L. Ron Hubbard? The community that developed around him? How that community exists now and their belief practices? All of these questions almost surely would be addressed because Scientology is so poorly understood by the majority of Americans (this author would include himself in the group who does not truly understand the group). However, many will say that such conversation is moot for studying Early Christianity and the New Testament - surely in that context, such modern discussion is untenable. There seem three levels of critique - Everyone "knows" what a Christian community looks like and as such, this type of erudition is unnecessary. Further, such sociological discussions about ancient history simply are not possible as we don't have the data. Finally, Christianity is simply "different" than other religions, so any type of general discussion about it in context would make little sense. I have always found this argument fundamentally flawed. First, I do not think it is by any stretch of the imagination obvious what a Christian community in the first century looked like just because there are 21st century groups that hold the same name. Further, that sociological data is not available is a fact of life when studying ancient religion; however, the fact that a discussion is challenging is not a good argument for not having it. It is possible to reconstruct something that gives a bit of the social world, that is surely better to use as a base than nothing at all. Finally, the idea that Christianity is somehow so different from other religions that it is somehow exempt from the category is simply naive. When the Jesus movement begins, it does not imagine itself as a fundamentally different phenomenon, it did not even imagine itself as a new world religion. When Paul writes, he never says that he is joining something aggressively different, he instead argues that this is just a new phase in how God relates with humans - fully in the context of what he would have called Judaism. Therefore, the seeming exemption of Early Christianity from this careful study needs to be demolished.

This blog intends to discuss matters that are both clearly defined (I will do my very best when I discuss something like "religion" or the "world" to explain exactly what I am discussing) and are not dismissive. Further, the discussion can only go "beyond the inner group" if it is using common scholarly parlance. Therefore, I will be dialoging with major figures in the field of religion in order to attempt to have discussions that can be universal. As such, this blog will feature arguments from me, book reviews, and links to other sites that are interesting for this aim.

The scholarly study of religion has been, at times, said to be dying. There are statistics of religion departments (in addition to many of the liberal arts) being shut down or subsumed by other departments in universities. Being a young professor, I am constantly being told how few jobs are available and how many of them are going away and never coming back. Taking my inspiration from Benjamin Zander who addresses a similar situation in classical music on www.ted.com, I will work from my fundamental assumption about the scholarly study of religion. My assumption is fundamentally, that if people were to give it a chance and have a bit of education, they would see the scholarly study of religion as the pathway to understanding a new world they had never known. Essentially, I argue that everyone likes the study of religion - they just don't know it yet. It is the purpose of this website to help them know it.

As to a bit of personal information, I am a young professor at a small conservative Christian college in the Pacific Northwest. As this blog will display, I am not necessarily as conservative as some members of the college and as such, it is necessary for me to post with anonymity. I both could in theory get attacked by some members of the college for my orthodoxy (though that risk is relatively weak), I do not want any of my students to feel alienated by my views (politically, socially, or theologically) and have this website be a hindrance to my real job - being a teacher to students. Therefore, I have selected from the book of Ruth in the Hebrew Bible the name "Paloni Almoni" (Ruth 4:1) which is translated often as "a certain unnamed one"- the kinsman closer in relation to Naomi who sells his right to redeem Ruth to Boaz.