The field of religion is plagued by the enduring question of the definition of the its topic. What kind of definition of religion can competently include a monotheistic faith such as Judaism or Christianity while at the same time including an “atheistic” (in the sense of having no “gods”) such as some forms of modern Buddhism or Taoism? The attempts usually made either become so narrow that some things usually included as “religion” is excluded, or so wide that things that are nearly never considered religion would be included – for instance some definitions of religions would also perfectly describe political movements or even sporting events. However, the simple “let it be undefined because we all know what is being discussed” is at best scholarly abhorrent and at worst obfuscates the topic enough that any type of discussion is possible. Through a rethinking of the composition of a definition as such, religion can be classified in a way that might not be completely satisfactory for all of society, but will be helpful in understanding the general term called “religion.”
The first major challenge in defining religion is the essentialist thinking of most in Western society. Everyone wants to know what religion “is.” The problem with this approach is that no two people would have the same view. A devout Christian might say that religion is the proper expression of God’s love toward humans; whereas a skeptical atheist might suggest that religion is a human institution that deludes the rational component of humans. Neither of these statements can be proved wrong; similarly neither is proved correct. This kind of “essential” definition is not only impossible to verify, it is unhelpful beyond the insular confines of one’s own group. Often, these types of definitions of religion are not, in actuality, used for self-definition; rather, they are constructs used to attack those who disagree. This type of adversarial attitude is dismissive and as such has no place in scholarship.
Rather than focusing on what religions “are,” it is much better to describe how a religion functions. While the “truth” of a religion is an unverifiable dictum, how religions function for humans is something that can be helpfully analyzed. While the reality of the monotheistic Christian god can be disputed, that Christians find meaning from their constructed relationship with that god (whether he is real or not) is indisputable. This allows for a discussion that is both possible and helpful for a study that grows beyond the realm of a single tradition. From this point, then generalization and helpful comparison is possible.[1]
If it is possible to make some generalization about how religion usually functions for humans, when religions do not meet some of those expectations, then it causes a scholar to ask helpful questions. Further, if the function of religion can be predicted, then human behavior in relation to religion can be finally understood. In addition, the once undefinable, impossible, completely biased topic of discussion now becomes a reasonable subject of discourse.
The main objection to such a definition of religion is that it expects humans to act consistently. If humans are generally consistent, then religions can be expected to generally respond to needs for people consistently. This view is unprovable, but tenable. Due to the limits of measurable inquiry, there is no way to prove that humans will always act the same way (the fact that humans generally have acted consistently in the past is not sufficient proof for the future, as futures are by definition untestable); however, if the assumption that humans generally are consistent is a given, nearly the entirety of the known data (that which has occurred in the past and is occurring in the present) makes sense. To use an illustration, the argument for consistency of behavior of humans is likened unto an argument to interpret the meaning of a painting. There is no way to prove measurably an argument, it is possible to establish a rubric, that if accepted makes the whole of the painting make sense. A similar view can be taken toward the study of religion.
This argument uses James Wellman and Kyoko Tokuno’s description of religion as a helpful discussion of how religion can function. It is broad enough to address many of the key issues involved and a very good starting point from which further discussion can be directed. The description is presented, “The symbolic and social boundaries of religion (no matter how fluid or porous) mobilize individual and group identity in conflict, and sometimes violence, within and between groups.”[2] This is not a full definition of religion, but it provides helpful clues of how religions can function in everyday life. The first element is that religion mobilizes identity. This is the primary function of religion for people. Peter Berger argues that groups create “religious worlds” in order to find meaning and place in a constructed society.[3] This discussion of meaning and place in society is, for our purposes, a reasonable definition of “identity” as a descriptor of religion.
As one develops identity through an imagined creation of the social world around them through the vehicle called religion, it becomes necessary to build boundaries. It is impossible to know who one is without also knowing who one is not. This applies to an individual person believing in God (such as might be held by Schleiermacher), or by a group (such as the Roman Catholic church in the 19th century). The spread of “heresy” in fact, is merely an insider who does not fit within the boundaries that a religion holds and must be driven out in order to sustain the integrity of the identity of a group.
The function of identity formation is done often by means of “truth-claims.” The easiest way for religions to define who they are is by describing the vacuous concept of “truth.” The philosophical concept of “truth” will not be addressed here, for our purposes, truth is described as the imagined fundamental elements that make one’s constructed “world” function. Without these elements, the constructed world no longer exists. For a fundamentalist Christian, that Jesus died to save the souls of humans who are inherently sinful is a truth – without this, their socially constructed identity no longer functions. Such a person might also hold that a combustible engine needs gasoline to function; however, such a view is not necessary for their constructed world, and therefore this view would not be considered a truth. The second part of the view of “truth” is that fundamental elements (truth) are seen as universal. It is not only in their constructed world that these truths are held, but these truths apply to every aspect of the world and it is only they who have identified and used them in the most helpful paradigm (their constructed “world”).
The boundary creating aspect of religion is so strong that it is not an overstatement to think of religion in the same manner as one thinks of ethnicity. Ethnicities (in contrast to kinship) are not merely genealogical relations, they are “cultural” choices. One can self identify as “German” when in fact they live in America, have only one out of four grandparents that are of German descent, and have never spoken a word of German in their life. The individual, for whatever reason, has chosen to identify as German and has assumed some of the culture of that value and identified it as one’s own.[4] However, there are certain boundaries to ethnicity – one must participate in a bare minimum of cultural “knowns” or they are not really of that ethnicity. A similar view can be expressed toward religion. There are general boundaries that are rather rigid that must be at least generally followed or one cannot claim to really be part of that religious group. This then solves the awkward discussion of something like Judaism answering whether they are a religion or an ethnicity. The answer is that not only is Judaism both, in fact all of religions are both – Judaism is only distinct in that it is less easy to join the group if you are not born into it than some other religions such as Christianity, for instance.[5]
Recognizing that religions function primarily for the purpose of identity creation and in the process establish boundaries, makes it possible to discuss how religions can compete and clash with one another and with larger culture. When firm boundaries are established, one expects challenges to those boundaries (both from within and without) to continually arise. This can help understand what is happening and why in a particular situation.
Whether one holds to the fundamental assumptions about religion or not, the way religions function is a necessary piece of education one must understand in order to mitigate the challenges of the world.
[1] These characteristics are drawn from Jonathan Z. Smith, Imagining Religion: From Zion to Jonestown, introduction.
[2] James Wellman Jr. and Kyoko Tokuno, “Is Religious Violence Inevitable?” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion.
[3] Peter Berger, Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion
[4] This view is necessarily overstated. No person describes oneself monolithically. One is not only German – one can identify as German, American, Male, Washingtonian, Democrat, and Christian with no apparent difficulty (for further on this issue see Amartya Sen – Identity in Violence).
[5] The concept of religion as ethnicity can be found in a number of works. A few noted authors are Craig Prentiss, Jonathan Hall, Denise Buell, and Catherine Hodge.
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