I am not a political scientist or a modern theologian.
However, as I always tell my students, I pretend to be both. The problem with
that, of course, is that having a little knowledge is sometimes far more
dangerous than having none. However, this blog is specifically set up for me to
workshop ideas rather than publish papers. I do hope that some who know more
than me about modern theology and politics might have some helpful feedback.
I ran across a fascinating article on how Pope Benedict XVI
is both alike and different from John Paul II. Right now there is all kinds of
discussion about why Benedict is retiring (including some conspiracy theories
that are so absurd as to be howlers). I have no interest in that aspect of his
papacy – except for perhaps the new precedent that might be being set (though
time will only tell there), and how he will function in retirement (will he,
like other retired world leaders continue to be active in nonofficial roles,
etc.). However, this excellent study by Brian Flanagan does not get involved in
conspiracy theories about the pope’s retirement, instead it focuses on his
legacy and asks what he did and how.[1]
Flanagan proposes that while staying in the tradition of
John Paul II theologically, Benedict did it in an entirely new way. Rather than
being the charismatic personality that traveled the world, he focused on the
office of the bishop of Rome and spoke outwardly through the office, often
hiding his persona from the public. Consider Flanagan’s comments:
In contrast to John Paul’s sense of
personal, charismatic authority, Benedict’s model of papacy views its authority
as rooted in the office itself, in the duties and responsibilities of the
bishop of Rome, and in the pope as the guarantor of the tradition of the
church. In comparison to John Paul, Benedict at times seemed to hide his
personality behind his words, and to hide his particular preferences and
theological opinions behind the office itself. I believe that this was
intentional—not just a matter of personal idiosyncracy, but a conscious change
of direction toward a less personality-driven papacy. At one level, it was
rooted in a theology of episcopal collegiality that he assisted in crafting as
a peritus (‘expert’) at the Second
Vatican Council. But at a deeper level, it is consistent with his relative
suspicion of the mechanisms of a secular world. As an Augustinian theologian,
Benedict, despite his twitter feed, exercised a great deal of caution when
stepping out into the whirlwind of the modern media cycle. He avoided, by
choice as well as by temperament, much of the cult of personality that has been
such a dominant aspect of the modern papacy and which arguably reached its apex
in the example of John Paul. His resignation is therefore a coda, not a
surprise ending, to a deliberately diminished, intentionally less monarchical,
model of papacy.[2]
One can see that Flanagan interestingly suggests that the
lack of the charismatic individual and instead the office actually has the
effect of shifting the figure of the pope to be a less domineering force.
Theologically, this makes some sense (and there is reason to think that much of
what Benedict does is motivated by what makes sense theologically to him) – it
is the seat of Peter which has authority – the human on it is temporary.
While I believe that Flanagan is probably correct, I also
think that this is an example of how religion and politics have changed in the
past several hundred years all the way to the role of the bishop of Rome. To
show how it is changed, it is first necessary to understand the “two swords”
doctrine which was established by Pope Gelasius I (492-496). The concept was that God had two swords
by which he would exercise his will – the sacred and the state. However, the
true sovereign was God. Further, there was an obligation that all of God’s
believers were in his kingdom and it was the moral duty of this authority to
have that sovereignty expressed (despite whatever political borders might be
the case).[3]
While the two swords theology might sound like a division between the church
and state, the argument was that God was the true sovereign and all government
or church was merely his agent. Further, the church (encapsulated in the Bishop
of Rome) was the interpreter for God, and as such, the church became the de facto authority of the world. While
this might be shocking to some, for this paper, the question of who was truly
in charge has less importance than the idea of sovereignty spreading beyond
political borders (and therefore justifying moving beyond those borders as a
role the government and the church in tandem out to be doing).
This model was challenged by the famous Peace of Westphalia
in 1648 at the conclusion of the 30 years war. Many are aware of the decision
at the end of the thirty years war which allowed states to choose their own
religion (or rather the ruler of states to choose their religion) – “cuius regio, eius religio.” The
practical argument presented was that political borders now were sovereign in
and of themselves. So long as a nation did not bother others, they could do
mostly as they pleased. The idea of sovereignty had formally changed. Not
surprisingly, Pope Innocent X condemned the peace of Westphalia as a direct
challenge to the two swords theology.[4]
The Peace of Westphalia, however, has mostly failed. While
it is true that there is a basic idea of national independence from others, the
idea that a nation can simply do whatever it likes without the rest of world
stopping them is simply not the case. The volume of the Sacred and the Sovereign was conference papers discussing the
Kosovo military operation. Aside from what one thinks of running interference
for a Presidential sex scandal, the stated reasons for the Kosovo military
operation were that what the government in Kosovo was doing to its own people
was unacceptable (hardly the Westphalian idea about allowing someone to do
whatever they liked so long as it was in their own borders). I should present
as an addendum that I do not know the intricacies of the Kosovo conflict and I
would have no doubt if there were in fact many things going on with the crises
that had little to do with international politics.
The observation most notable in the volume was that while
there is no idea of a universal religion any longer (the two swords theology
only works if the government believes the views of the church), but instead a
universal value system that allows some things but not others. It begins to ask
the question, “what would it say about us if we did not act on behalf of these
others.”[5]
Therefore, religion does have an important place – but no longer is it because
it is assumed that all nations should be following the sovereignty of God.
Instead, the true sovereignty surpasses any figure or nation and instead is in
a system of ethical values.
The way the church can still have a place globally is
through these “global” values (understanding that not everyone has these
values, but the idea is presented here just to show the international nature of
activities). John Paul II, for instance, accomplished this task through his
charismatic personality. Aside from a few moments of directly challenging the
Soviet Union, John Paul II, for the most part traveled the world and encouraged
politicians and laypeople to act in certain ways in accordance with universal
values (of course those values would be channeled to be in accordance with
those of the Roman Catholic church). Benedict XVI did it in a different way –
through the office of the Papacy, he presented the values that he felt should
be universally held (with his controversial comments about homosexuality,
Islam, etc.).
What is most present, however, is the abandonment of desire
to truly have the two swords theology expressed as they might have during the
period before the Reformation. One did not see, for example, either Pope
leaning upon world leaders to act in certain ways because it was their duty as God’s
arm to bring universal religiosity upon the earth. Instead, when they exercised
their political ambitions, it was independent – either through being so well
liked, or through their own office.
Here, I do not attempt to get involved with the intricacies
of Roman Catholic politics – not only is it something that is not my interest,
I do not have the knowledge to truly speak about it. What is strking here is
how churches and government are expected to interact. No longer do we even have
the Bishop of Rome sitting down and meeting with world leaders to be their top
advisor on practical political matters in most cases. Instead, it is a much
more nuanced argument about values that show a more “modern” tendency.
A final note is simply a caveat that I do not believe that
either of these popes particularly was innovative in this matter. I am sure
that previous papacies were in accord with this. I only use these two current
popes as examples to show a general trend.
[1] Brian
Flanagan, “John Paul II, Benedict XVI, and the upcoming conclave: Considering
the role of the pope in a post-Christian world” Marginalia Review of Books, http://themarginaliareview.com/archives/1833,
accessed Feb. 27, 2013.
[2] Ibid.
[3] John D. Carlson
and Erik C. Owens, “Reconsidering Westphalia’s Legacy for Religion and
International Politics” in John D. Carlson and Erik C. Owes (eds.) The Sacred and the Sovereign: Religion and
International Politics (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press,
2003), 12-14.
[4] Ibid.,
14-19.
[5] Susanne
Hoeber Rudolph, “Religious Concomitants of Transnationalism: From a Universal
Church to a Universal Religiosity?” Sacred
and the Sovereign, 139-153.
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