Thursday, September 4, 2014

Getting beyond the “problem of evil”: How Origen of Alexandria helps us rethink theodicy


Of the topics relating to religion and philosophy, the so called “problem of evil” is one of the most popular among Christians (and possibly others as well). In my classes, students often perk up whenever the topic is broached. They want to know why God could allow evil in the world. They then enjoy readings that discuss theodicy in all its forms. However, the “problem of evil” the way students often consider it is not the same thing as theodicy. Theodicy has more to do with variance than it has to do with good and evil. Origen of Alexandria’s system as presented in On First Principles is a tremendously helpful case study to illustrate this point – his argument does not solve how there could be “evil” in the world; however, it is fully a theodicy that explains why people are in different circumstances.

The “problem of evil” is a modern concept that has become very popular among (at least) Protestants. The reason it has become so central is that it is a logical problem which religious adherents attempt to solve. The problem can be presented briefly:
1.     God is all powerful
2.     God is all good
3.     God wants to be in relationship with humans
4.     God could have created a world however he chose
5.     This world is full of sin and evil and humans are not in relationship with God
This “problem of evil” then is that God could have created a world where there was no sin and evil. Further, if God is all good, he logically should have wanted that. Given that he didn’t, he either is not completely powerful and couldn’t create an alternate world; or contrarily, he could create a world where this was possible, but isn’t completely good and instead created a system where humans have to suffer (making him far closer to being cruel than good).

This problem is one that has been solved in a variety of ways. The most popular solution has been found in the pages of C.S. Lewis and reiterated throughout Christian apologetics. The essential argument as depicted in The Problem of Pain is that in order for there to be true devotion to God, there had to be a way not to be devoted to God – there had to be room to sin in order for there to be followers. This is essentially an argument for a kind of “free will.” With this understanding, then, humans did not make the right decision and humans therefore have to suffer the consequences. Further, God cannot simply change the rules of the game for individual cases, because the entire system depends upon freewill having consequences one way or another.

The problem with this, is that it does not actually solve the problem. While the idea of freewill functions fine for the here and now, it does not solve the problem of why people are born into the system in the first place. If the system is dependent upon freewill and humans can make the decision to follow or not, it is logical, that humans should be on an equal playing field – for everyone to be a blank slate to make a good decision, there needs to be the opportunity to make that decision. There are several problems. First, people do not always have the same opportunity. While Paul can argue that there is the “law written on people’s hearts,” it is relatively clear that those who have actually heard the Torah have a better a chance of following it than those who have to rely completely on the arbitrary nature of their conscience – just as Paul says, “What advantage has the Jew – much in every way.” People do not have equal opportunity.

Second, for the system to be dependent upon free will, then a person should be able to opt in (or not) to the system at all. However, no one chooses to be born. Indeed, if God was truly all good and all powerful and created a system based entirely on will, his forcing people into a situation with cosmic consequences would seem beastly. Just because someone could choose to follow God rightly doesn’t mean one will. Therefore, God is forcing people into situations they did not select.

The problem with the solution is not its logical challenges, the problem is that it is a bad question. The “problem of evil” is not clearly considered. “Evil” is seen as an unambiguous entity. It is usually determined by the “absence of Good” or even stronger yet, is presented as a cosmic force (in the way that Paul could speak of Sin and Death as cosmic forces that enslave people). Whatever one thinks of the spiritual reality of these figures, how “evil” manifests itself in life is necessarily ambiguous. What is considered evil in the 6th century – e.g. the painting of icons of Christ – is seen as not only acceptable, but religiously valuable in the 9th century.

What is needed is to move beyond “the problem of evil” and into a full discussion of theodicy. Theodicy, in the terms of Peter Berger, is how a religious world legitimates itself. It is the thing that answers the question of “why.” Why is it that we are where we are and not somewhere else? This, of course, does include the answers to “why” some people are suffering so much. However, it would equally include the answers to why other people are suffering so little. Both sides are important, because both sides are the manifestation of the actual problem – variance.

Origen of Alexandria is famous for his speculative work, On First Principles. The text is not meant to be a systematic theology, but was read as such for many years and consequently is known by many more religious thinkers than any of Origen’s other works. It also contained controversial views that would later be challenged. Here, we consider one of those controversial views – the preexistence of souls – in order to display how theodicy is an issue of variance rather than issue of objective evil.

Origen argued that all souls were originally in right relationship with God before becoming manifest in a human body. These figures, for lack of a better term, are often called “logikons” – meaning they were in relation in the mind of God. These souls then individually chose to fall away from God. Their choice of fall, then, caused God to place them in corporeal forms in order that they might learn what it is that they particularly needed so that they could eventually return to that same place where they were as logikons. This is illustrated by a quotation of Justinian of On First Principles:
Those rational being who sinned and on that account fell form the state in which they were, in proportion to their particular sins were enveloped in bodies as a punishment; and when they are purified they rise again to the state in which they formerly were, completely putting away their evil and their bodies…Along with the falling away and the cooling form life in the spirit came what is now called soul, which is capable nevertheless of an ascent to the state in which it was in the beginning.[1]
Justinian led the church council that deposed Origen’s ideas – this one being among the ideas challenged – and so one needs to take his quotations with a grain of salt. However, the views expressed in this particular quote seem to be in close alignment of the portions of Origen that are extant, and so there is good reason to think that this is either a genuine quotation of On First Principles, or is summarizing well the ideas expressed there.

Origen’s view of this pre-existence of the soul is usually expressed in consideration of theodicy. The idea is that one of the major problems associated with the logical challenge of birth has been solved. It was above directed that no one chose to be born, so therefore, the argument of freewill is tenuous. Here, Origen argues that all people did choose to be born, therefore this problem would in theory be solved. However, Origen hasn’t actually solved that problem. Just because he argues that people did choose to fall and therefore be born, he has no argument for why they were created as logikons in the first place. All Origen has done is pushed back the problem to a new ontological level.

Origen, however, had no interest in solving the problem of will. He was interested in solving the problem of theodicy. Theodicy is more about variance than anything else. Origen was interested in why people’s births were so different. Why is it one person was born into a very wealthy family and another a very poor family. Why would one be born with a physical ailment and another healthy? The problem was not a logical one about humans in relationship to God as much as in comparison with others. Origen’s solution is set to discuss variance and why some people are born with very much and others with very little:
Now since the world is so very varied and comprises so great a diversity of rational beings, what else can we assign as the cause of its existence except the diversity in the fall of those who decline from unity in dissimilar ways?[2]
He argues the problem is a lack of unity. His solution is that some fell farther from God than others and thus are in different positions from one another. He explains that this creates very real advantages and disadvantages to different people. People are born with different abilities depending upon their original fall:
Now if this is so, it seems to me that the departure and downward course of the mind must not be thought of as equal in all cases, but as a greater or less degree of change in the soul, and that some minds retain a portion of their original vigor, while others retain none or only very little. This is the reason why some are found right from their earliest years to be of ardent keenness, while others are duller, and some and are born extremely dense and altogether unteachable.[3]
Origen argues that some are truly more gifted than others and this is best explained by the concept of the preexistence of souls and their fall.

Origen, then, does not solve the problem of the omnipotent and all good God creating a world where people could suffer. Indeed, Origen even argues for a providence in one’s fall. It can be certainly argued that one’s station was not quite “earned” – instead, God had a hand in placing people in a position on the earth for what would best serve their salvific needs – not necessarily a one to one relationship that the farther one fell, the worse one’s estate would be on the earth. He argues that eventually God is in control and creates a functioning universe:
For there is one power which binds and holds together all the diversity of the world and guides the various motions to the accomplishment of one task, lest so immense a work as the world should be dissolved by the conflicts of souls. It is for this reason, we think, that God, the parent of all things, in providing for the salvation of his entire creation through the unspeakable plan of his word and wisdom, has so ordered everything that each spirit or soul, or whatever else rational existences ought to be called, should not be compelled by force against its free choice to any action except that which the motions of its own mind lead it, - for in that case the power of free choice would seem to be taken from them, which would certainly alter the quality of their nature itself – and at the same time the motions of their wills should work suitably and usefully together to produce the harmony of a single word, some being need of help, other as able to give help, others again to provide struggles and conflicts for those who are making progress, whose diligence will be accounted the more praiseworthy and whose rank and position recovered after their victory will be held more securely, as it has been won through difficulty and toil.[4]
Origen has not solved the “problem of evil” if anything he has intensified it. He has described the “free will” solution while at the same time arguing God is really in control.

What Origen has done beautifully, though, is truly addressed the problem of theodicy. Theodicy is not about suffering, it is about understanding why. Peter Berger describes theodicy as taking what seems anomic (disorder) and making it fit one’s nomos (accepted “order” what would be called now a “worldview”).
Theodicy directly affects the individual in his concrete life in society. A plausible theodicy (which, of course, require an appropriate plausibility structure) permits the individual to integrate the anomic experiences of his biography into the socially established nomos and its subjective correlate in his own consciousness. These experiences, however painful they may be, at least make sense now in terms that are both socially and subjectively convincing. It is important to stress that this does not necessarily mean at all that the individual is now happy or even contented as he undergoes such experiences. It is not happiness that theodicy provides but meaning.[5]
Berger argues that societies create a “nomos” or “way things are supposed to be.” Humans are satisfied so long as that nomos is established and continues to thrive. The problem arises when someone is not convinced that this nomos is accurate or if someone has an experience that does not fit this preexisting societal structure.

Theodicy, then, is the explanation – why it is that stimuli that does not seem to fit (anomic data) can be transferred to fit within the nomos. This then leads tot eh question of what is “suffering” – suffering is not an objective thing, it is completely ambiguous. Suffering is the crisis of experiencing something anomic. Why this is so significant is that the nomos may not be particularly pleasant. Suffering is not connected with pleasure, particularly. Theodicy is a problem of variance. If someone, due to a medical condition, has to sleep 12 hours per day, society would consider that a burden and a moment of suffering that would need to be explained. However, if someone has to sleep 8 hours per day, this is not considered suffering, it is good health and valuable for everyone. The only real difference is that everyone has to sleep 8 hours per day. The problem only arises when someone is different from the rest. Then it is described as suffering – some are doing poorly while others are doing well. Suffering, is therefore always a measure of variance.

Origen’s theodicy does not solve the “problem of evil.” At one level, this cannot be solved – Augustine famously quipped that attempting to find the efficient cause of evil is like trying to see darkness or hear silence. What is more, though, Origen is less interested in that logical problem and far more interested in the practical problem – why are people suffering. People suffer by comparison. Origen shows that a true theodicy doesn’t make suffering go away or justify to God, instead, Origen shows that variance makes sense. While many people will disagree with Origen (as did the second ecumenical council of Constantinople in 553), On First Principles is a very helpful example of what a theodicy should be doing and what it should not. Theodicy should explain variance and we should abandon the so called “problem of evil.”  


[1] Justinian Ep. ad Menam cited in Butterworth, On First Principles, 126.
[2] P.A. 2.1.1. trans. Butterworth
[3] Ibid., 2.8.4.
[4] Ibid., 2.1.2.
[5] Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy, 58.

2 comments:

  1. What CS Lewis passages were you referencing? Also, where do you find that formulation of the problem of Evil (especially the part about God wanting a relationship); is that a more Protestant reading? It's very different from the general form of the problem as I think of it, indebted mostly to Hume.

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    1. Thank you for the question. In Lewis on this topic, I am most familiar with The Problem of Pain, particularly chapters 1-4. I would provide page numbers, but the edition I own is a compilation of several of his works, so the page numbers are relatively meaningless. I am not sure if that is a primary problem for Protestants or not; I am an amateur in apologetics. I am most familiar with this from the early Church. The idea that God needed a relationship with his subjects can be found in Athanasius's On The Incarnation of the Word of God, particularly paragraphs 1-6.

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